Belief, Content and Cause by Grimaltos, Tobies & Moya Espí, Carlos
F"" TOBIES GRIMALTOS AND CARLOS j. MOYA 
_ÉláÉú=Content1 and Cause 
In this paper we intend to analyse two cases of change in belief. 
These cases have been designed by John Perry and William G. Lycan in order 
to show that the semantic properties of u subject's beliefs, such as their prop-
ositional content> cannot explain lhc change in that subject's behavior. Both 
Perry and Lycan think that the conclusion they extract from these cases can 
be raised to a general thesis, namely that a fairly sharp boundary must be 
drawn> inside the concept of belief, between semantic properties and causal 
powers. Perry thinks we need a distinction between belief object, or propo-
sition believed, and belief state. It is the latter that accounts for the belief's 
causal role. Lycan> in turn, elaborates on Perry's distinction by asking us to 
distinguish between two individuative schc1nes for beliefs, namely the truth-
conditional scheme and the computational scheme: "The truth-conditional 
individuative scheme is typically imposed when what concerns us are the 
truth-vnlues or other semanlic aspects of beliefs; the computational scheme 
is imposed when what we care about is causal effects" (Lycan 1988: 86). We 
shall contend, instead, that both cases can be accounted for 'with no need to 
create a gap between propositional content (individuated in terms of truth 
conditions) and causal or computational role. We shall try to show that, in 
both cases, the relevant change in the subject's behavior is explained by a 
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change in the propositionnl conlenl of his beliefs. Our critical analysis of 
Pcrry's and Lyca n's cases is mcanl lo enhance the prospects for the view that 
ordinary, wide content or meaning is causally efficacious and explanatorily 
relevant, againsl the nowadays widely spread scepticism about such a causal 
efflcncy and explanatory relevance. 
1. Perry's example. 
V, us start with the by now famous Perry's example: 11I once fol-
lowed a tra il of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down the 
aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the 
shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip 
around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch 
up. Finally il dawned on me. l was the shopper I was trying to catch"(Perry 
1993: 33 ). Perry comments on his own example: «1 believed at the outset 
thnt the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess. And I was right. But I 
did no t believe that I was making a mess. That seems to be something I 
came lo believe... My change in beliefs seems to explain my change in 
behavior" (Perry 1993: ibid). Let us call the time when Perry is looking for 
the shopper with the torn sack 'tl ', and the time where he discovers that he 
himself is the shopper wilh the torn sack ' t2 '. Obviously, a change in belief 
oc(urs at t2. nut it is not an easy task to say exactly what this change consists 
in. Perry says that this change is not a change in the proposition believed, 
either de re or rfe rficto. According to Perry, it is a change in belief state, a 
state that would be shared by "all the good-hearted people who have ever 
been in a supermarket, noticed sugar on the floor, and been ready to say 'I 
am making a mess'" (Perry 1993: 47). What all these shoppers have in com-
mon "is not what Lhey believe. There is no de dicto proposition that all the.,. 
shoppers .. . believe. And there is no person whom all the shoppers believe to 
be making a mess ... "(Perry 1993: ibid). What all these shoppers have in 
common is a be lief state and we classify them in the same group for the pur-
poses of "explanaLion and prediction,,(Perry 1993: 48). Perry seems to sup-
pose that, in his own example, the crucial step towards this state would 
occur when he starts thinking of the shopper with a torn sack (namely him-
self) not as the shopper with a torn sack, but as he himself. 
We do not. want to deny that index.icals are essential in many cases for 
action causation and explanation. This is something that Perry beautifully 
:;hows. ll is also true that, if we tried to say what all the aforementioned 
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shoppers have in common, we should have to use indexicals. We should 
have to say something like "each believes or himself lhal he himself is nrnk-
ing a mess." However, we think that Perry is overstating his case. In our 
opinion, what explains his change in behavior is (or is also) a change in what 
he believes, a change in the proposition he believes. There is also a change in 
his psychological state, a complex change indeed, but this change is 
prompted by a change in what he believes. We shall try to show that, at t I, 
Perry believes a certain proposition and that, at t2, he ceases to believe this 
and goes on to believe a different proposition, one whose truth conditions 
are, not just different, but even opposite to those of the proposition he 
believes at tl. Nevertheless, we shall also try to see why Perry's proposal 
looks correct, though it is not so. 
In dealing with Perry's and Lycnn's examples, we will make rather free 
use of some of the theoretical tools we can find in Stalnaker's book lm7uiry 
(Stalnaker 1984). We are not sure that Stalnaker himself will approve of this 
use. In fact, we can find in his book some remarks that could align him with 
Perry and Lycan. 1 We think, however, that the main stream of his work goes 
against these authors, proposals. We will take side with Stalnaker in favour-
ing a. pragmatic picture of intentionality and in holding that propositions, 
the contents of intentional states, arc possibilities, sets of possible worlds. 
Moreover, we shall make use of some ideas that have been developed at 
length in a previous paper by T. Grimaltos and C. Hookway (Grimaltos and 
Hookway 1995). 
2. What Perry believes. 
Let us start analysing Perry's example. He says that, at t 1, he 
believed that the shopper with a torn sack was making a rhe.ss and that he 
was right in believing this. In saying thal he was right in believing this, Perry 
seems to imply that his being making a mess was a truth condition of his 
belief at tl, a truth condition that, as he discovers later, was in fact satisfied 
at tl. That Perry was the shopper with a torn sack and was making a mess 
would be what makes true both what he believes úí=tl, namely that the shop-
per with a torn sack was making a mess, and what he comes to believe at t2, 
namely the belief he would express by saying or thinking "I am making a 
mess." But only this latter way of thinking this fact, this essentially indcxical, 
l. Sec, e.g., Stalnaker ( 19811: 82). 
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first-personal way, would be what exµlains his change in behavior. We seek 
lo show, instead, tha t this change is due to a change in the proposition 
believed loo. 
Jt seems clear that the definite description "the shopper with a torn sack11 
cannot have a referential use in this context, for Perry does not know who 
the shopper in question is. The use of this definite description seems to be 
attributive (though maybe not purely so, as will be seen). Let us eliminate, 
for simplicity, the specification "with a torn sack.'' So, one way of character-
ázánú= ,,,hat lie :;ays he believes al l I is to say that he believes that there is 
someone (and only one) who is a shopper and is making a mess. Let us call 
this propositio1' 'P'. ln formal terms (where <S' stands for <being a shopper' 
and '!vl' for 'being making n mess'). 
(P) 3x j(Sx A Mx)A(y)(My- >x=y)] 
According to this interpretation, any shopper present in the supermarket at 
t l, i11c/11di11g Perr)' himself. can be the one who is making a mess. To make 
things easier Lo represent, let us suppose that, both at tl and at t2, there are 
only four shoppers in the supermarket, that is, that the predicate "being a 
úhnéécê?={Sx) could be satisfied by only four people at tl: a (Perry himself), 
b, (, and d. Now, under this assumption, what Perry believes at tl, on this 
interpretation, is as follows, in formal terms, 
( P') fvln v Mb v Mc v Mei 
where 'v' is to be read as an exclusive 'or'. Is this interpretation of what Perry 
believes nl t l correct? We do nol think it is. Here is why. In order to find who 
the messy shopper is, Perry undertakes due action. This action consists in 
following the trail of sugar in order to find the culprit. But Perry is a rational 
agent, who $eeks to reach his ends in as much economical a way as is possi-
ble for him. And it is obvious that the mosl economical way to finding the 
culprit is to look into his ovrn cart first, before embarking in looking for 
other shoppers, if 011/y he hnd considered the possibility that he himself were 
the rnlprit, that is, if he had believed the proposition P'. So, he had not con-
sidered Lhat possibility and he did nol believe P'. What Perry believes at tl is 
not P either, namely that there is someone (and only one) who is a shopper 
and is making a mess, but rather something like this: that there is someone 
(and onl)' one), clifferc11t from hi111sclf, who is a shopper and is making a 
mess. Let us call this proposition 'Q'. In formal terms, 
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(Q) 3x [(Sx A Mx)A(y)(My-> x== y)]A•Ma 
Now, adopting the snme assumption about the shoppers thnt were present 
in the supermarket, what Perry believed, at tl, is Lhe following, in formal 
terms, 
(Q') (Mb v Mc v jdFA•ú·fo=
again with an exclusive 1or'. And he \Nas wrong in believing this, and not 
right. What Perry says he believes at t l is ambiguous between these two 
readings, namely P (P') and Q (Q'). However, a pragmatic perspective on 
belief makes it dear that the second reading is the correct one. Under the 
first reading, Perry would have inspected his own cart first. 
Let us go now to t2. When Perry acknowledges that he himself is making 
a mess, he comes to believe a .proposition that is not only different from, but 
also opposite to, the one he believes at tl, a proposition that excludes just 
the possibilities included by the proposition he believes at t1 and .includes 
the only possibility excluded by this proposition. At tl he believed that 
(Q') (Mb v Mc v Md)A•Ma 
Now, at t2 he comes to believe the proposition R: 
(R) Ma A •(Mb v Mc v Md) 
The truth conditions of these two propositions, Q' and R, are not only dif-
ferent, but opposite. It is this dramatic, radical change in the proposition 
believed that explains his change in behavior. 
3. A diagnosis. 
Let us try a diagnosis of what is happening here. Perry seems to 
suppose that there is n proposition he believes all the time, namely that the 
shopper with a torn sack is making a mess. Since he says that he is right in 
believing this, he must suppose that this proposition corresponds to our 
proposition P (or P'). What changes at t2 would be his belief state, roughly 
the way he believes this proposition. He starts believing it in a general, 
descriptive way, thinking of the culprit as the shopper \·vith a torn sack, and 
then he goes on to believe it in a first-person, essentially indexical way, 
thinking of the messy shopper as bimsclf. Our analysis has been different. 
We have denied that Perry believed proposition P (or P') at any time. At tl, 
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Perr)' believed proposilion Q (or Q'). At t2, he came to believe proposition 
R and stopped believing Q (or Q'). But is there not a sense in which Perry 
believed also proposilion P (or P') all the time? Well, here is how we see 
things. P can be deductively derived from Q, that is, from a proposition we 
have contended Perry believed at tl. P can be derived from Q by detaching 
its fi rst conjunct. And P', in turn, can be derived from Q' by first detaching 
the first conju nct, namely Mb v Mc v Md, and then introducing a new dis-
jum:t, Ma. So, al l I, propositions P and P' can be derived from the proposi-
tions Perry bel ieves, namely Q and Q'. Besides, P and P' are true, though Q . 
and Q' arc false. Now, P' can also be derived from R, the true proposition 
Perry comes to believe nt t2, by first detaching the first conjunct, Ma, and 
then intro<lucing the appropriate disjunctions. And P, with appropriate 
assumptions. namely that the range of x are the four shoppers a, b, c, and d, 
can also be der1 .ied from R by means of existential generalization. P and P' 
are true all the time. Does Perry bel ieve them all the time? Perry is rational 
and knows logic. So, he would have come lo accept P and P', in the sense of 
believing that these propositions were true, because they followed from the 
propositions he believed at tl and from the proposition he came to believe 
at t2. But he would not believe P (or P') in the sense in which he believed Q 
(or Q') and R. His belief about P (or P') would only be a belief about the 
truth value oF that proposition. The onl}' behavioral consequences of this 
bel ief would be .o assent if asked whether this proposition was true. Taking 
this meta-belief (as we could call it) as a basis for his dispositions to act 
would be irration<il, given that il contains less information than the proposi-
tions he belil'Ves and on which he is disposed to act. The truth of P (or P') 
leaves open more possibilities than the truth of either Q (or Q ' ) or R. This is 
most clearly seen at t2, when Perr}' comes to believe that he himself is mak-
ing a mess (though it aJso holds at tl ). Once he believes this, namely R, and 
reduces the possibilities lo one, there is no point in widening the range of 
possibilities again, believing that he himself is making a mess or any of the 
other shoppers is . This is a loss, and not a gain of information. There is no 
poi nt in taking again as objects of belief possibilities that have been excluded 
b}' what he now believes. Deduction does not always lead to belief, as one of 
us has shovm in a different paper.2 
2. Grimaltos and Hnokway ( 1995) . . Grimaltos' and Hookway's position is con-
tained in the fo llowing:" Deduction gives rise to belief when there is a question to 
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Our diagnosis, lhen, has hvo pnrts. First, it might be this gap between 
psychology of belief and logic, and not a supposed split between proposition 
believed and state of belief, or between semantics and causal role, what is at 
stake in Ferry's example. And it might be the presence of proposition P (or 
P'), that Perry would believe true both at LI and at t2, in that it is logically 
implied by the propositions he believes at either time, that creates the 
appearance that the change in behavior is not due to a change in the propo-
sition believed. 
4. What If ... ? 
Suppose, however, that il had been a shopper, other than Perry, 
say shopper c, who was making the mess. If this were the case, il might be 
objected that what Perry believed al L 1 ',namely Q or Q', would also be true 
at t2'. This is right, but it does not show that there is no change in proposi-
tion believed. In this alternative story, the propositions Perry would believe 
at tl' and at t2' would also have had different (though not opposite) truth 
conditions. At t I' Perry would have had the same belief as at t 1, that is> he 
would have believed Q (or Q'). And at t2', after finding the shopper who 
was making the mess, namely shopper c> his belief would have been that c, 
and only c, was making a mess. Let us call this proposition 'S'. In formal 
terms, 
(S) Mc/\•(Ma v Mb v Md) 
Once Perry comes to believe this latter proposition, he cannot go on believ-
ing Q (let alone P), though he would believe that Q (and P) were still true, 
in that they follow from what he now believes. In this case> there would be a 
proposition> P, that Perry would believe true at L l' and at t2', and another 
proposition, Q, that he would believe at t1 • and would merely believe true at 
t2'. But the presence of P and Q as objects of Perry's 'believing-true' would 
not show that P or Q were what Perry believed all the time and> therefore, 
that there was no change in proposition believed, in terms of truth condi-
tions. S is true if, and only if, c, and no one else, is making a mess. P and Q 
are obviously more permissive. They could be true even if c was not making 
a mess. Again, once Perry comes to believe S, he ceases to believe Q, for S 
which the conclusion of the inference is the strongest answer possessed by the 
believer" (p. 41 ). ll is clear that th is condition is not satisfied by the inference lo 
P or P', in the context of Perry':; example. 
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contains more informarion and rules out more possibilities than Q. Perry, as 
any of us, is psychologically unable to go on seriously believing Q after com-
ing to believe S. Q would be merely the object of an attitude of believing-
true, wich negligible behavioral consequences. 
Someone might object, however, (in fact, someone has objected) that we 
are not reaching the core of Perry's position, namely that index.icals such as 
'I', even if they refer lo the same person as other expressions, including 
proper names, and are semantically equivalent to them, differ in causal role, 
so that, i11 the end, semantics and causal role must be kept apart. This is 
relateu to the uneasiness someone might feel about our use of the constant 
'a' in the formal representation of our analysis of the original Perry>s exam-
ple. Should it be read as Tor 'Perry' or what? Let us go to this point. Sup-
pose that, while Perq1 is pouring sugar and looking for the messy shopper, 
the loudspenkers of the supermarket announce: "John Perry is making a 
mess." Perry, in hearing this, comes to believe that John Perry is making a 
mess. This, Perry would contend, is not sufficient to bring about the rele-
vant change in behavior unless he also believes that he is John Perry, which 
brings in the indexical and its distinctive causal role. Suppose that, in fact, in 
hearing the loudspeakers' announcement, Perry does not realize that John 
Perry is hims"'Jr He believes that John Perry is making a mess but he does 
not believe that he is making a mess (in fact, he believes he is not making a 
mess). After a while, he realizes that he is John Perry and comes to believe 
thnt he is making a mess. Pcrry's belief that John Perry is making a mess and 
his belief that he is making a mess seem to be semantically equivalent, 
though causally different. 
Our answer would run thus. When Perry believes that John Perry _is 
making a mess without realizing that he is John Perry and so without believ-
ing that he is making a mess, "John Perry" is functioning, in the context of 
Pcrry's belief, as a definite description, such as "the shopper called 'John 
Perry'," or maybe as an indefinite description, such as "a shopper called 'John 
Perr)"." In this case, again, these descriptions cannot have a referential use, 
since Perry does not know who the shopper in question is. Their use seems 
to be attributive, though, again, maybe not purely so, since he has excluded 
himself as a potential fulfiller of the descriptions. So, under this plausible 
interpretation, the two beliefs are semantically different and have different 
propositions as objects. Perry's first belief is that the (or a) shopper called 
"lohn Perry," who is not himself, is making a mess. This belief is false and 
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would be true in a world in which Perry>s name is not ccJohn Perry' and in 
which someone different from Perry, called "John Perry,» was making a mess 
in the supermarket. His second belief, that he is making a mess, would not 
be true in that world, and is true in the actuul world. There are worlds where 
Perry>s name is not "John Perry," though there are not worlds where Perry is 
not Perry or where he is not hin1self. The two beliefs have different causal 
roles, but, unfortunately for the defenders of the split, they also have differ-
ent truth conditions. 
So far, we have been assuming that Perry has excluded himself from the 
extension of the relevant descriptions. Tt might be thought that our thesis 
rests crucially on this assumption. Let us give it up and see what happens. 
Suppose, then, that Perry suffers a sudden <1mnesia attack. He has momen-
tarily forgotten his name and, when he hears the loudspeakers' announce-
ment, he is agnostic about whether his name is "John Perry.>' In this case, he 
has not excluded himself as a potential fulfiller of the description "the shop-
per called 'John Perry'." As far as he knows, he might be the relevant shopper, 
though he is not sure about that matter. So, let us suppose, he looks at his 
driving licence to discover that his name is, in fact, "John Perry," as a conse-
quence of which he modifies his behavior in the relevant way and rearranges 
his cart. What about this case? We cannot say, as in our previous example, 
that what he starts believing, namely that the shopper called "John Perry>' is 
making a mess, is false. However, this belief and his later belief that he is 
making a mess are not semanticall)' equivalent either. Though both beliefs 
are true in the actual world, their truth conditions arc different. "The shop-
per called 'John Perry»" unlike 'I', as thought by Perry, can designate different 
individuals in different possible worlds. There are worlds, namely those in 
which ((John Perry" is not Perry's name, but the name of a s:lifferent shopper 
in the supermarket, where his first belief would still be true but where his 
second belief would be false. Even in this case, then, Perry believes different 
propositions, individuated in terms of truth conditions, before and after his 
discovery. Again, his change in psychological state and behavior is prompted 
by a change in the proposition he believes. His second belief excludes possi-
ble worlds included in what he starts believing. 
The case we have just considered is one in which what Perry believes at 
tl" would be close to P (or P') while what he believes nt t2" would be dose 
to R, with the appropriate changes in the predicates. This case, in fact, seems 
to be closer to Perry's interpretation of his own original example, according 
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to which, as we saw, he did not seem to exclude himself from the set of 
potential culprits. This interpretation of the original Perry's example can be 
dealt with along the lines of our last example and is not in the way of our 
contention. 
5. Lycan's example. 
Let us go now to Lycan's example. As in Perry,s example, we shall 
also distinguish tl an<l t2. Lycan,s example is, at a first sight, importantly dif-
ferent from Perry's, for in it the subject, Smith, starts with a belief whose 
object can be expressed with a sentence containing a demonstrative expres-
sion, namely 'that man', and not a definite description, such as "the shopper 
with a torn sack." 
I kre is L)'can's example: "Suppose Smith believes that that man he is os-
lending is about lo be pounced on by a crazed, homicidal puma, but unbe-
knownst to Smith the man he is ostending is again himself reflected in a 
mirror. He will proceed on his way, unconcerned about his own safety, until 
he turns and sees rhe puma in the tlesb and thereby suddenly acquires the be-
lief that he himself is abo11• to be pounced on, which change of belief will 
prompt an imir1cdiale and striking change in behavior" (Lycan 1988: 85). Ly-
ca n argues that, in terms of truth conditions, Smith believes the same propo-
si tion all the time: "Smith already believed that that man he was ostending 
was about to be pounced on; he already believed what Kaplan (1975) calls 
the 'singular proposition' <Smith,x (x is about lo be pounced on)>. So what 
he comes to believe upon seeing the puma in the flesh is not that proposition. 
Yet whnt he docs come to believe, that he himself is about to be éouncÉú=on, 
IH1s exact ly the snme truth-conditions as that singular proposition and is true 
in just the same possible worlds" (Lycan 1988: ibid). So, his change in belief 
is to be characterized in computational terms, not in truth-conditional 
terms: the representations 'I' and 'that man' play different roles in Smith's 
psychological economy, though both in fact refer to the same person in the 
same possible words, so that they give rise to sentences that, though sónúacíá­
cally different, express the same proposition. It is the narrow, computational 
individuation scheme that explains the difference in beliefs and the corre-
sponding difference in behavior. So Lycan contends. 
Lycan's example, then, seems to be harder to deal with than Perry's. A 
definite description, such as "the shopper with a torn sack," unlike T, as 
thought by Perry, can designate different individuals in different possible 
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worlds, so that "the shopper with a torn sack is making a mess" and " [ am 
making a mess:' as thought by Perry, express propositions that have differ-
ent truth conditions and can be Lrue in different possible worlds. However, 
demonstrative expressions such a 'that man' and the personal pronoun T 
seem to designate rigidly, so that if they succeed in designating the same 
individual on an occasion, namely Smith in Lycan's example, they designate 
this same individual in all possible worlds where this individual exists. 
Therefore, «that man is about to be pounced on" and "I am about to be 
pounced _on» express propositions that are true in the same possible worlds 
if, in fact, 'I' and 'that man' designate the same person in the actual world. It 
seems, then, that the change in Smith's behavior cannot be caused by a 
change in the proposition he believes, individuated in terms of truth condáú=
tions, which rernain the same from l I to t2. 
However, we shall try to show, against Lycan's analysis of his own exam-
ple, that what explains Smith's change of behavior is a change in the propo-
sition hÉú=•elieves, though this latter change certainly triggers a change in his 
éúóchologNKKWal=state. If so> there is no need to resort to a split between the 
truth-conditional and the computational individuative schemes for the sub-
ject>s beliefs. 
6. What Smith believes. 
We can distinguish two possible interpretations of Lycan's exam-
ple. According to the first, Smith is not aware that he is looking at a mirror. In 
this case, the reference of 'that man' somehow fails, for there is no man where 
he is ostending. Then, the belief he has at t l, that he would express by saying 
"that man is abou_t to be pounced on," is not true. It is not, as Lycan says> that 
what he believes at tI has the same truth ·conditions as what he comes to 
believe at t2, upon seeing the puma in the flesh> namely that he himself is 
about to be pounced on. 'That man' does not refer to himself. It does not 
refer at all. Or, if it does, it refers to an image in the mirror or to a place that is 
at a distance of 2d from the place Smith stands, where cl is the distance 
between Smith and the mirror. I.et us say that his belief at tl is t_rue in a pos-
sible world in which there is a man, different from himself, in the place he is 
pointing at, who is going to be pounced on. This possible world is different 
· from the world Smith inhabits at tl, where he himself is about to be pounced 
on where he stands, though, as we said, it is the first world where Smith's 
belief would be true. So, on the first interpretation, Smith believes, at tl, a 
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proposition thnl is different from the proposition he starts believing at t2 . . 
The two propositions have different truth conditions and are true in differ-
ent possible v1orlds. No need to split individuation of beliefs into two differ-
ent schemes: causal, computational role and truth conditions go together. 
Now to the second interpretation. According to this, Smith is aware that 
he is looking al a mirror. On this interpretation, Lycan's example coines very 
close to Perry's, for now 'that man 1 does not function as a demonstrative 
expression any more. This apparently demonstrative expression is rather a 
disguised form of a definite description, namely "the man reflected in that 
máêêoêDú=and can designate different individuals in different possible worlds. 
Again, as in our interpretation of Perry's original case, Smith is excluding 
himself from the range of possible persons that fill the description. The 
proposition Smith believes at tJ can be expressed by this sentence: «There is 
a man reflected in thal mirror, who is not myself and who is going to be 
pounced on.'' In this case, it is even clearer than in Ferry's case that, had 
Smith included himself in the range of the variable, the rational thing for 
him to do, assuming a normal amount of selfishness, would be to test this 
hypothesis first. So, Smith1s belief at tl is false, not true, and is true in the 
possible worlds in which the r úáan=reflected in the mirror is not himsel.f. At . 
t2, Smith comes to have a different belief, a belief whose object is a different 
proposition, a true one, namely that he himself is about to be pounced on. 
As in Perry's case, the new proposition includes the only possibility excluded 
by the first and excludes the possibilities that the first includes. The "striking 
drnngc in behnvior" at L2 is cuused by the fact that Smith comes to believe a 
proposition that is different from the one he believed at tl, a proposition 
with opposite truth conditions and true inn set of possible worlds l)Ot com-
possiblc with the set in which the other proposition is true. Again, no need 
to split indjviduation of belief into two separate schemes: causal role goes 
hand in hand with truth conditions. Possible variations on Lycan's example 
could be dealt with along the lines suggested by the above treatment of vari-
<Hions on Perry's example. 
It has often been emphasized that indexicality is implicit in many·appar-
ently non indexical expressions. Putnam suggests that natural kind terms 
are implicitly indcxical. Perry, in turn, speaks about "the implicit nature of 
much indexicnlity>' (Perry 1993: 49). Our analysis of Lycan's example shows 
lhat there is also much description implicit in many utterances of demon-
strative expressions and other reference terms. Besides, as we have also tried 
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to show in section 4, beliefs apparently involving rigid des ignators can con-
tain in fact definite descriptions which do not need involve a referential use. 
They can even contain indefinite descriptions.This might provide a way of 
dealing with some puzzles, such as Kripke's puzzle about 'London' and 'Lon-
dres'.- In one of the cases, 'London' (or 'Londres') mjght be a covert definite 
description, as is 'that man' in the second interpretation of Lycan's example. 
This can also show that, to use a Wittgensteinian expression, the craving for 
generality, the seek for universal reductions of concepts, is misguided. 
This completes the task we have meant to carry out in this paper. Our 
: aim has been a modest one. We have not tried to show that semantics and 
causal role should not be kept apart for what concerns intentional states. 
What we have tried to show is that Perry's and Lycan's examples do not 
prove that they should. We hope we have succeeded. 
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